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Abstract
I study the optimal taxation of wealth in a dynastic economy with heterogeneous
mortality risk, and various sources of wealth accumulation (including savings and
bequests). Working individuals are indexed by skills which are private information.
Skills not only determine earning abilities but also correlate with survival probability,
so that more productive agents on average live longer. My analysis points to the
longevity gradient as a crucial determinant for optimal wealth taxation, both from a
theoretical and from a quantitative angle. In particular, due to longevity variations,
savings should be marginally taxed in expectation, while bequests received early in
life should be marginally subsidized on average. For a plausible calibration to U.S.
data, such forces are commensurate with the actual levels of wealth taxation in a
sample of developed countries.
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1 introduction
This paper is motivated by two observations regarding the interaction between life
expectancy, wealth, and the tax code. First, individuals’ life spans affect the composition
of their own wealth and that of their heirs: all else equal, workers with longer life
expectancy tend to save more to smooth consumption, draw down their wealth more
slowly during retirement, and bequeath later.1 Accordingly, the impact of wealth taxation,
in the form of savings and inheritance taxes, can vary substantially across individuals
facing different mortality risk. The second observation is the well documented fact
that life expectancy positively correlates with socioeconomic status.2 In turn, lifetime
savings patterns and the timing of intergenerational transfers might be useful signals of
earning abilities and, hence, of optimal tax liability. How would an optimal tax system
incorporate these well established facts? In particular, how should the different sources of
wealth be taxed to account for the distinct savings patterns among the long-lived and the
short-lived? What is the optimal way to exploit the socioeconomic longevity gradient in
order to achieve redistributive objectives? Are these effects quantitatively relevant?
The goal of this paper is to provide guidance on these questions. I do so by analyzing
optimal wealth tax design within a dynastic model which features heterogeneous mortality
risk, and which allows for various sources of wealth accumulation. The main contribution
of the paper is twofold. First, I formalize how the socioeconomic longevity gradient
shapes optimal taxes, and show that it has disparate effects across different types of
wealth taxation. In particular, due to life expectancy variations, savings should be
marginally taxed, while bequests received early in life should be subsidized at the margin.
Second, I quantify the key forces behind optimal wealth taxes using U.S. data. For a
plausible calibration, the impact of the mortality gradient on optimal wealth taxes is
commensurate with the actual levels of wealth taxation in certain developed countries,
and can quantitatively dominate other prominent determinants identified in the literature.
The model economy lasts for an infinite number of periods and it is populated by
overlapping generations of agents who live for at most two periods. When young, agents
work, consume, and produce a descendant who is born in the following period. Old
agents (those who survive to the second period) only consume. At the beginning of each
period, young agents draw a skill (or productivity) shock which is private information as
in Mirrlees (1971). At the end of each period, young agents draw a publicly observable
1See, e.g., De Nardi et al. (2006), De Nardi et al. (2009) and Piketty (2014), Chapter 11.
2Contemporaneous studies quantifying this phenomenon include Singh and Siahpush (2006), Waldron
(2007), Pijoan-Mas and Ríos-Rull (2014), and Chetty et al. (2016). These works also indicate that mortality
differentials across socioeconomic groups have substantially widened in recent decades.
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survival shock which determines whether they live for an additional period. Crucially,
skills not only determine the earning abilities of the agents (i.e., the ability to transform
effort into effective effort), but also correlate with their survival probabilities, so that more
productive individuals on average live longer. Both productivity and survival shocks are
independently and identically distributed across dynasties and time.
Individuals are altruistic towards their descendants. Such intergenerational links
combined with the demographic structure of the model give rise to various sources of
wealth accumulation. The old can accumulate wealth in the form of either savings or
“late” bequests, i.e., post-mortem transfers from old parents. The young, on the other
hand, accumulate wealth from “early” bequests, which emerge whenever parents die
prematurely. In turn, these last inheritances can either come from savings of parents or
grandparents.
Optimal tax instruments are only restricted by informational frictions and, hence, can
potentially vary across the different wealth sources mentioned above. Throughout the
paper, I focus on a particular tax implementation of the constrained efficient allocation
along the lines of Kocherlakota (2005). Such an implementation features nonlinear labor
income taxes, and linear wealth taxes whose rates depend on labor income histories. I
adopt a utilitarian normative criterion which values children’s welfare more than parents
themselves do through altruism. In this sense, the social level of altruism is larger than
the individual one. This is a common specification in intergenerational models of social
insurance (see Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007)) and the idea is that, with
altruistic parents, children should be “double counted” under any utilitarian welfare
criterion which attaches separate weights to parents and children.
To solve the model and characterize optimal taxes, I extend the method developed by
Farhi and Werning (2007) to an environment with uncertain life spans, heterogeneous
mortality risk, and a continuum of skill types. I focus on the properties of optimal wealth
taxes at a steady state, which can only exist whenever the level of social altruism is greater
than the individual one.
The main normative prescription of the paper is that, on average, life expectancy
differentials push for (i) marginal taxation of wealth accumulated by the old (in the form
of savings and late bequests), and (ii) marginal subsidization of wealth accumulated by
the young (in the form of early bequests from parents and grandparents). Intuitively, the
presence of mortality differences leads to heterogeneous tastes over survival contingent
consumption. That is, high (low) ability individuals prefer future allocations featuring
relatively high (low) levels of dynastic consumption in the event of survival. The policy
maker can thus exploit this fact to motivate more productive types to exert effort. Specifi-
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cally, she provides low income dynasties with “too little” consumption in the survival
state and “too much” consumption in the death state. These distortions are implemented
via positive marginal wealth taxes on the old, and through negative marginal wealth
taxes on the young. Notably, this result is robust to the presence of a market for annuities
in the decentralization.
Besides the effect of mortality heterogeneity, taxes on intergenerational transfers are
affected by the difference between social and individual altruism coefficients. Due to this
feature, marginal bequests and inter-vivos taxes should be negative and progressive. In
essence, when society cares more about future generations than parents themselves, inter-
generational transfers generate a positive externality and should therefore be encouraged
via progressive subsidies. I show that such “externality from giving” forces (which are
extensively discussed in Farhi and Werning (2010)) can be isolated from the effect of the
longevity gradient in my tax formulae.
The next step in the analysis is to calibrate the model to quantify its tax implications.
This exercise also permits an exploration of dimensions of the model which are hard to
characterize analytically.
A crucial object for the calibration of the model is the probability of survival across
skill types. While a number of previous studies have correlated survival probabilities
to observable socioeconomic characteristics (such as income or education), to the best of
my knowledge few have estimated this correlation with unobservable skills.3 I calibrate
this object to U.S. data by exploiting the relationship between mortality outcomes and
permanent income in the Health and Retirement Study, a biennial panel survey of
individuals over 50 years old. The resulting predictions regarding life expectancy across
incomes and ages are validated externally based on other studies. Using the estimate for
the survival probability across skills, I quantify the effect of mortality heterogeneity on
the optimal wealth taxes levied on a representative dynasty. The latter is defined as the
dynasty entitled with the median level of welfare at the steady state.
The major quantitative findings are the following. First, the magnitude of the effect of
differential longevity on optimal wealth taxes is significant: on average, such a force range
between 23-46 basis points in absolute terms at annual rates. To put these magnitudes
in perspective, it is useful to allude to the levels of wealth taxes around the world:
Switzerland, for example, imposes progressive wealth taxes ranging between 3-94 basis
point per annum (depending on the cantons); or the “solidarity tax on wealth” in France
varies between 0.5-1.5%. Second, there is substantial variation in the influence of longevity
heterogeneity across income levels. As for savings taxes, annual expected distortions
3One exception is the contemporaneous work of Hosseini and Shourideh (2017).
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climb up to 0.4% for low incomes, and asymptote at roughly half of that value at the
top. The variation in bequest distortions is even larger, and ranges between 0.2%-0.8%
in absolute terms. Third, I quantify the relative contribution of differential longevity vs.
“externality from giving” forces in bequest taxes. I find that the former can dominate the
latter for incomes at the top 10% of the distribution.
related literature
This paper contributes to the dynamic public finance literature on optimal wealth taxation
under private information, which early contributions include Kocherlakota (2005) and
Albanesi and Sleet (2006). Unlike my paper, this literature either does not distinguish
among the source of wealth being taxed (thus focusing on the design of a broad based
wealth tax schedule), or centers attention on bequest taxation. One exception can be
found in Shourideh (2012), who studies the determinants of optimal wealth taxation
in the presence of capital income risk and discriminates between capital income from
controlled businesses, outside the business, and bequests.
There is a vast literature on the optimal taxation of intergenerational transfers (see
Kopczuk (2013) for a survey). Within those papers, Farhi and Werning (2010) highlight the
influence of giving externalities on optimal estate taxation. My paper incorporates those
effects, but mainly focuses on a novel rationale for bequest taxation based on longevity
heterogeneity. Moreover, I provide a quantitative analysis of each of the drivers of optimal
bequest taxation.
Farhi and Werning (2013) analyze optimal estate taxation under altruism heterogeneity
and find that optimal estate taxes can be positive depending on the redistributive objectives
of the policy maker. A similar result is obtained by Piketty and Saez (2013), who evaluate
optimal inheritance taxation using linear or two-bracket tax structures, in environments
in which heterogeneity come from labor income and inheritance. In both of these
frameworks, the positive bequest taxation result is underpinned by two features: a
particular source of heterogeneity which is not earning abilities, and a special normative
criteria that departs from the utilitarian metric. Unlike these works, agents in my
paper are only indexed by earning abilities (which are perfectly correlated with survival
probabilities) and the social welfare function is always utilitarian.
Given that heterogeneous mortality risk is akin to heterogenous preferences, this
paper is also related to Golosov et al. (2013), who quantitatively evaluate the case for
tying nonlinear capital taxation to savings preferences in a two-period framework. Saez
(2002) also justifies non-zero capital taxation based on heterogeneous discount rates across
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earning abilities.
Finally, this paper adds to the literature on the policy implications of differential
mortality. In the Mirrlees Review, Banks and Diamond (2010) claim that savings taxes
should, ideally, be tailored to life expectancy differentials across labour productivities. In
this paper, I provide a formal and quantitative assessment of this issue. My work is also
related to the contemporaneous paper of Hosseini and Shourideh (2017), who analyze the
effect of mortality differentials on optimal income tax design in a Mirrleesian framework.
A notable difference with this paper, is that the authors focus on the optimal insurance
arrangement of a single cohort in a context without bequest motives. Other papers have
quantified the link between the income-longevity gradient, but do not analyze optimal
policy responses. Such studies include Garret (1995) and Liebman (2002), who focus on
the U.S. Social Security system, as well as Brown (2002) within the context of individual
retirement accounts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. This
section also discusses the influence of longevity differentials on wealth taxation within a
simple example. Section 3 analyzes the tax implementation in the general model, and
derives the main analytical results of the paper. Section 4 looks at the calibration, and
presents the quantitative results. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are contained in the
Appendix.
2 the model
Consider an overlapping generations economy that lasts for T = ∞ periods indexed by
t ∈ N. Agents face uncertain life spans and live for at most two periods. When young,
agents work, consume and produce a single descendant who is born in the following
period. Old agents, i.e., those who survive to the second period of their lives, only
consume. A unit measure of initial old individuals is alive at t = 1. Parents are altruistic
to their children, but not vice versa, so the model allows for a dynastic interpretation in
which each initial old corresponds to the head of a dynasty.
Agents are subject to two types of idiosyncratic shocks: productivity and survival
shocks. At the beginning period t, young agents draw a productivity (or skill) shock
θt from a distribution F with support Θ =
[
θ, θ¯
]
and density f . Similarly, at the end
of period t, young agents draw a survival shock st ∈ {0, 1} with probability pi(st). For
any agent born at t− 1, st = 1 if such an agent survives to t and st = 0 otherwise. Both
productivity and survival shocks are i.i.d. across dynasties and time. I denote t-histories
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of productivity and survival shocks by θt ≡ (θ1, θ2, ..., θt) ∈ Θt and st ≡ (1, s2, ..., st) ∈
{0, 1}t.4 Productivity realizations are private information to the agents, but survival shocks
are publicly observable.
Productivity shocks have two roles. First, in any period t, skills determine the ability
of young agents to transform effort nt into effective effort yt according to the linear
technology
yt = θt · nt.
In addition, productivity shocks impact the probability that young agents survive to
the next period. Specifically, let pi(st|θt−1) denote the conditional probability of drawing
survival history st given skill shock realization θt−1. I assume that only own productivity
realizations affect the probability of survival of the agents, so that pi(st|θt−1) = pi(st|θt−1),
and pi(st|θt−1) = pi(s1)pi(s2|θ1)...pi(st|θt−1), with
pi(st|θt−1) =
P(θt−1), st = 1,1− P(θt−1), st = 0,
where P : Θ → [0, 1] denotes the probability of survival as a function of the skill
realization. Throughout the paper I make the following assumption on the derivative of
P:
Assumption 1. P′ exists and it is strictly positive.
By Assumption 1 more productive individuals on average live longer. This speci-
fication captures the well established fact that socioeconomic status (here indexed by
productivity) positively correlates with life expectancy. The empirical validity of Assump-
tion 1 is confirmed in Section 4.
Dynasties are identified by their initial discounted expected utility entitlement w ∈ W ,
which is drawn from the distribution Ψ1 with density ψ1. Letting c
y
t and c
o
t denote
consumption of the young and the old in period t, respectively, an allocation in this
economy is defined by the sequence of functions {c, y} ≡ {{cjt}j=y,o, yt}∞t=1 where
cyt :W ×Θt × {0, 1}t → R+, cot :W ×Θt × {0, 1}t → R+,
and
yt :W ×Θt × {0, 1}t → [0, y¯],
4Without loss of generality, I assume that s1 = 1 so that the initial old are alive when the economy
starts.
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for some y¯ > 0.
Preferences of a w-dynasty over the allocation {c, y} can be represented by the expected
utility function
U({c, y}; w) =
∞
∑
t=1
∑
st
∫
Θt
(βδ)t−1pi(st|θt−1)
[
stu(cot (w, θ
t, st))
+ β
(
u(cyt (w, θ
t, st))− h
(
yt(w, θt, st)
θt
)) ]
f t(θt)dθt, (1)
where f t(θt) ≡ f (θ1) f (θ2)... f (θt) denotes the density of θt. δ ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal
discount factor, while β ∈ (0, 1δ ) is the intergenerational discount factor, which I refer to
as the coefficient of individual altruism in what follows. As it is standard, u′, −u′′, h′ and
h′′ exist and are positive, u′(0) = ∞ and u′(∞) = h′(0) = 0.
An allocation {c, y} is said to be resource feasible if for all t ∈N:
∫
W×Θt
∑
st
pi(st|θt−1)
[
stcot (w, θ
t, st)
+ cyt (w, θ
t, st)− yt(w, θt, st)
]
f t(θt)ψ1(w)dθtdw = 0. (RC)
Equation (RC) implies that there is no physical capital in this economy. This is a common
assumption among dynamic social insurance environments, in the tradition of Atkeson
and Lucas (1992) (see, e.g., Albanesi and Sleet (2006)). The absence of capital considerably
simplifies the analysis but does not affect the main results on optimal wealth taxes below.
Planning Problem. Constrained efficient allocations are recovered from the solution to
a mechanism design problem where agents report their types to a social planner and
receive allocations as a function of such reports. This is without loss of generality thanks
to the revelation principle.
Define a reporting strategy as σ ≡ {σt}∞t=1, where σt : Θt → Θ. An allocation is
incentive compatible if
U({c, y}; w) ≥
∞
∑
t=1
∑
st
∫
Θt
(βδ)t−1pi(st|θt−1)
[
stu(cot (w, σ
t, st))
+ β
(
u(cyt (w, σ
t, st))− h
(
yt(w, σt, st)
θt
)) ]
f t(θt)dθt, (IC)
for all w ∈ W , θt ∈ Θt, σt ∈ Θt.
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An allocation is said to be feasible if it satisfies (RC), (IC) and delivers utility w to the
dynasties with initial entitlement w, i.e.,
U({c, y}; w) = w. (PK)
The social planner ranks allocations according to the utilitarian social welfare function
SWF =
∫
W
∞
∑
t=1
∑
st
∫
Θt
(βˆδ)t−1pi(st|θt−1)
[
stu(cot (w, θ
t, st))
+ βˆ
(
u(cyt (w, θ
t, st))− h
(
yt(w, θt, st)
θt
)) ]
f t(θt)ψ1(w)dθtdw, (2)
where βˆ is the coefficient of social altruism, which satisfies βˆδ < 1, along with the following
assumption:
Assumption 2. βˆ > β.
I make Assumption 2 for two reasons. First, it allows me to work with a flexible welfare
criterion in which society attaches separate welfare weights to different generations. That
is, this assumption implicitly reflects that when parents and children are included as
separate entities into the social welfare function, descendants are “double counted” (since
parents are altruistic).5 The second reason for assuming that the coefficient of social
altruism exceeds its individual counterpart is technical: as will be discussed in Section
2.2, a steady state can only exist as long as βˆ > β.
Constrained efficient allocations, denoted by {c?, y?}, maximize (2) over the set of
feasible and incentive compatible allocations. That is:
{c?, y?} = arg max
{c,y}
SWF (PP)
s.t. (RC), (IC), and (PK).
In the following sections I characterize the solution to the planning problem in
(PP), and construct an optimal tax system which implements {c?, y?} as a competitive
equilibrium.
5In the special case that βˆ = β, social welfare is identified with that of the initial dynast.
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2.1 a stripped -down example
Before putting the fully fledged model to work, this section illustrates the main forces
driving optimal taxes within a simple example.
Environment. Consider a special case of the environment described previously. The
economy lasts for two periods t = 1, 2. Productivity shocks can only take two values in
Θ = {θL, θH}, with θL < θH and Pr(θL) = Pr(θH) = 0.5. Agents work only in the first
period, but everyone receives an endowment of e > 0 in both periods. Finally, social
and individual coefficients of altruism coincide, i.e., βˆ = β, and the initial distribution of
continuation utility entitlements Ψ1 is degenerate with a single point mass at some w.
In this environment, the utility function in (1) boils down to
U({c, y1}; θ) = u(cy1)− h
(y1
θ
)
+ P(θ)δ
(
u(co2) + βu(c
y
2)
)
+ (1− P(θ))δβu(c˜y2),
where c˜y2 is the consumption of the descendants if the parent dies in the second period.
Assuming P(θH) > P(θL) implies that:
∂U({c, y1}; θH)/∂ci2
∂U({c, y1}; θH)/∂c˜y2
>
∂U({c, y1}; θL)/∂ci2
∂U({c, y1}; θL)/∂c˜y2
, for i = o, y. (3)
Verbally, different types have different preferences over survival contingent consumption:
high (low) types relatively prefer allocations where the dynasty consumes more in the
survival (death) state. The logic is that, given their mortality types, dynasties enjoy
allocations with higher consumption in the most likely state of nature.
Planning Problem. It is possible to characterize the constrained efficient allocations by
applying the following algorithm:
1. Solve a relaxed version of the planning problem in (PP), by assuming the planner can
transfer goods across periods using a linear technology with rate of return Rˆ > 0.
2. Iterate on Rˆ until C1 − Y1 = C2 = e, where Ct and Yt denote, respectively, total
consumption and output in period t.
Clearly, the original planning problem in this simple economy could be attacked
directly, by bypassing the iteration step. I only follow the method above to simplify
the interpretation of the intertemporal wedges in what follows (such method is also
analogous to the one used to solve the general version of the model).
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Assuming that only high types have incentives to misreport, the relaxed version of the
planning problem is:
max
{c,y1}
∑
θ∈Θ
U({c(θ), y1(θ)}; θ) (4)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ
[
cy1(θ)− y1(θ) +
1
Rˆ
P(θ)
(
co2(θ) + c
y
2(θ)
)
+
1
Rˆ
(1− P(θ))c˜y2(θ)
]
= 2E, (5)
and
U({c(θH), y1(θH)}; θH) ≥ U({c(θL), y1(θL)}; θH), (6)
where E ≡ e (1+ Rˆ−1) is the present value of the endowment.
Two Intertemporal Wedges. I now define two intertemporal distortions at the optimal
allocation. The savings wedge τa : Θ→ R is given by
1− τa(θ) ≡ u
′(cy?1 (θ))
δRˆu′(co?2 (θ))
,
while the bequest wedge τb : Θ→ R is
1− τb(θ) ≡ u
′(cy?1 (θ))
δRˆβu′(c˜y?2 (θ))
.
The distortions τa and τb are implicit marginal wealth taxes on two sources of wealth
accumulation: earned wealth through savings and transferred wealth through bequests,
respectively.6 It is straightforward to construct an explicit tax implementation with
linear wealth taxes that match these wedges. For reasons of space, though, I relegate the
implementation analysis to later sections.
The following proposition characterizes the intertemporal wedges:
Proposition 1. Savings and bequest wedges satisfy: τa(θH) = τb(θH) = 0,
τa(θL) = µ
u′(cy
?
1 (θL))
λ
P(θH)− P(θL)
P(θL)
, and τb(θL) = −µ
u′(cy
?
1 (θL))
λ
P(θH)− P(θL)
1− P(θL) ,
6Clearly, there are other ways of expressing wealth distortions. A popular alternative in the dynamic
public finance literature is to define an “ex-ante” savings distortion which does not depend on future states
of nature. See, e.g., Golosov et al. (2006).
11
where µ,λ > 0 are the Lagrange multipliers on (5) and (6), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Variations in longevity risk create a force for taxing savings and for subsidizing
bequests of low earners. As a consequence, if high types mimicked low types, their
wealth returns across survival states would be affected in two ways. First, expected
returns on wealth accumulation would decrease. Essentially, high types are more likely to
survive, so they put relatively more weight on the state in which wealth gets marginally
taxed. Second, if high types did not exert high effort, they would experience higher
volatility in their after-tax wealth returns. This is because after-tax returns are state-
dependent for low incomes, but riskless for high incomes. The social planner exploits
both of these channels to induce high types to work at full potential.
It is worth noting that absent differences in mortality risk across skills, Proposition 1
implies that τa(θ) = τb(θ) = 0 for all θ. In this case, the classical Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) result holds and wealth taxes are superfluous to implement the optimum.
2.2 recursive formulation of the planning problem
Let Ψt denote the cross-sectional distribution of utility entitlements at time t. The solution
to the planning problem in (PP) defines a mapping Ω and a law of motion Ψt+1 = Ω(Ψt).
While, in principle, the planning problem in (PP) could be solved recursively using Ψt as
a state variable (see Atkeson and Lucas (1992)), this method poses obvious challenges
due to the high dimensionality of Ψt. For this reason, I focus on a relaxed version of the
planning problem.
Relaxed Planning Problem. My approach to solve (PP) extends the method developed
by Farhi and Werning (2007) to an environment with uncertain life spans, heterogeneous
mortality risk, and a continuum of skill types. The solution to the relaxed problem coin-
cides with the original one at a steady state, but the former admits a recursive formulation
using a low dimensional state vector.
A steady state in this environment is defined as a distribution of continuation utility
entitlements Ψ satisfying Ψ = Ω(Ψ). The existence of a non-degenerate steady state
distribution hinges on Assumption 2, i.e., βˆ > β. If this parametric restriction didn’t hold
and βˆ = β, long-run inequality would be unbounded and the classical “immiseration”
result of dynamic contracting frameworks would emerge.7
7While I do not provide a proof showing that a steady state exists, my numerical simulations indicate
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The relaxed version of the planning problem is obtained by replacing the original
sequence of resource constraints in (RC) by the intertemporal resource constraint:
∞
∑
t=1
(
1
Rˆ
)t−1 ∫
W×Θt
∑
st
pi(st|θt−1)
[
stcot (w, θ
t, st)
+ cyt (w, θ
t, st)− yt(w, θt, st)
]
f t(θt)ψ(w)dθtdw = 0, (IRC)
where Rˆ > 0 is an intertemporal price, and ψ is the probability density function of w at
the steady state. Evidently, the original set of resource constraints implies (IRC), but the
converse is true only at the steady state Ψ. My focus on steady states also justifies using
a constant intertemporal price Rˆ.
The relaxed planning problem can be written as
max
{c,y,λˆ}
∫
W
L(w)ψ(w)dw, s.t. (IC) and (PK), (RPP)
where
L(w) ≡
∞
∑
t=1
∑
st
∫
Θt
pi(st|θt−1) (βˆδ)t−1 {stu(cot (w, θt, st))
+ βˆ
(
u(cyt (w, θ
t, st))− h
(
yt(w, θt, st)
θt
))
− λˆ
(
1
Rˆβˆδ
)t−1 [
stcot (w, θ
t, st) + cyt (w, θ
t, st)− yt(w, θt, st)
]}
f t(θt)dθt,
where λˆ > 0 is the multiplier on the intertemporal resource constraint (IRC).
Given w and λˆ, it will be convenient to define a component planning problem by
max
{c,y}
L(w), (IC) and (PK). (7)
Bellman Equation at Steady States. The advantage of working with the relaxed plan-
ning problem is that it allows for a simple recursive formulation at steady states along
that this is the case. Farhi and Werning (2007) formally prove that the existence of a steady state is
guaranteed under βˆ > β in a dynastic environment with one-period lived agents.
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the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987). Specifically, first note that a steady state requires
Rˆ =
1
βˆδ
, (8)
otherwise aggregate dynastic consumption would not be constant across periods. Using
this fact, the component planning problem (7) at a steady state can be written recursively
as:
J(w, s) = max
{c,y,w1,w0}
∫
Θ
{
su(co(θ)) + βˆ
(
u(cy(θ))− h
(
y(θ)
θ
))
− λˆ
[
sco(θ) + cy(θ)− y(θ)
]
+ βˆδ∑
s′
pi(s′|θ)J(ws′(θ), s′)
}
f (θ)dθ (9)
subject to
V(θ) = su(co(θ)) + β
(
u(cy(θ))− h
(
y(θ)
θ
))
+ βδ∑
s′
pi(s′|θ)ws′(θ),
V ′(θ) = βh′
(
y(θ)
θ
)
y(θ)
θ2
+ βδ∑
s′
∂pi(s′|θ)
∂θ
ws
′
(θ),
w =
∫
Θ
V(θ) f (θ)dθ,
where ws
′
denotes the continuation utility contingent on the future survival state being
s′ ∈ {0, 1}.
In (9) I applied a first-order approach to the incentive compatibility constraints (IC),
whereby the original set of incentive compatibility constraints is replaced by local first
order conditions ensuring that truth telling is a local maximizer for each type.8 Solutions
to (9) satisfy the original set of incentive compatibility constraints (IC) under certain
monotonicity conditions on the optimum which are verified ex-post. Next I establish this
result.
Assumption 3. For all (w, s) the solution to (9) satisfies:
d
(
w1(θ)− w0(θ))
dθ
≥ 0, dw
0(θ)
dθ
≥ 0, and dc
j(θ)
dθ
≥ 0, (10)
for j = y, o.
8 Recent examples of this approach within the dynamic public finance literature include Kapicˇka (2013),
or Golosov et al. (2016).
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Lemma 1. Suppose that for all (w, s) the solution to (9) satisfies Assumption 3. Then the
allocation {c, y} generated by the policy functions of (9) is incentive compatible, i.e., it satisfies
(IC).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
An algorithm for attacking the relaxed planning problem in (RPP) is now evident:
(i) Fix a shadow price λˆ and solve (9); (ii) Find the steady state distribution of utility
entitlements Ψ given λˆ; (iii) Iterate on λˆ until the resource constraint (RC) is satisfied at
the steady state. I can then construct consumption and effective effort allocations using
the policy functions which solve this algorithm. Henceforth, I let {c∗, y∗} denote the
allocations obtained in this fashion.9
2.3 wealth wedges
Like in the simple example discussed in Section 2.1, given an optimal allocation {c∗, y∗}
it is possible to define two intertemporal wedges: The savings wedge τat : W × Θt ×
{0, 1}t−1 → R, which is given by
1− τat (w, θt, (st−1, 1)) ≡
u′(cy∗t−1(w, θ
t−1, st−1))
Rˆδu′(co∗t (w, (θt−1, θt), (st−1, 1)))
, (11)
and the bequest wedge τbt :W ×Θt × {0, 1}t−1 → R, which is
1− τbt (w, θt, (st−1, 0)) ≡
u′(cy∗t−1(w, θ
t−1, st−1))
Rˆδβu′(cy∗t (w, (θt−1, θt), (st−1, 0)))
. (12)
Additionally, in the full model I also define the inter-vivos transfers wedge τivt :
W ×Θt × {0, 1}t → R as
1− τivt (w, θt, st) ≡
u′(co∗t (w, θt, st))
βu′(cy∗t (w, θt, st))
. (13)
The inter-vivos distortion should be though of as an implicit marginal tax on wealth
transferred from living parents to their children.
9In the numerical simulations below, policy functions always satisfy the monotonicity conditions in
Assumption 3. Then, provided regularity conditions for the equivalence of the recursive and the sequential
formulations of the planning problem hold, constrained efficient allocations {c?, y?} solving (PP) satisfy
{c∗, y∗} = {c?, y?} at a steady state.
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3 tax implementation
I focus on a tax implementation which features linear wealth taxes which rates depend
on effective effort and survival shock histories. This implementation is along the lines of
Kocherlakota (2005). Individuals are subject to three different wealth tax rates: savings
taxes tat , bequest taxes t
b
t , and taxes on inter-vivos transfers t
iv
t , with t
j
t : W × [0, y¯]t ×
{0, 1}t → R for j = a, b, iv. In addition, agents pay income taxes Tyt : W × [0, y¯]t ×
{0, 1}t → R when young, and receive lump-sum transfers Lt :W × [0, y¯]t × {0, 1}t → R
when old. Finally, at any period t, old individuals make inter-vivos gifts in the amount gt,
and the young accumulate a risk-free asset at+1 in zero net supply with gross interest rate
R. To simplify the exposition, for the moment I preclude the old from leaving bequests.
This assumption is relaxed in Section 3.2.
Under this decentralization, for all (t, st, θt) w-dynasties choose {cyt , cot , yt, gt, at+1}∞t=1
to maximize (1) subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
cyt + at+1 ≤ yt − Tyt (w, yt, st)
+ (1− st)Rat(1− ttb(w, yt, st)) + stgt(1− tivt (w, yt, st)), (14)
cot + gt ≤ Rat(1− tat (w, yt, (st−1, 1))) + Lt(w, yt, (st−1, 1)), (15)
with a1 given.
I now define a competitive equilibrium under this implementation formally. In doing
so, I define the tax system as a sequence of functions T ≡ {tat , tbt , tivt , Tyt , Lt}∞t=1, and an
asset-gift allocation as the sequence {a, g} ≡ {at, gt}∞t=1.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is an allocation for consumption and effective effort
{c, y}, an asset-gift allocation {a, g}, a tax system T , and an interest rate R such that:
1. {c, y, a, g} maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraints (14) and (15).
2. The government’s budget constraint is balanced in every period.
3. The sequence of resource constraints in (RC) holds, so that the goods market clears.
An allocation {c, y} is said to be implemented by the tax system T if there is an asset-gift
allocation {a, g} and an interest rate R such that {c, y}, {a, g}, T , and R constitute a
competitive equilibrium. The next proposition provides the implementation result.
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Proposition 2. Let {c∗, y∗} be an optimal allocation that solves (RPP). Suppose that the policy
functions used to generate {c∗, y∗} satisfy Assumption 3 and that there is no bunching. Then
{c∗, y∗} can be implemented by a tax system T in which wealth taxes satisfy:
tjt(w, y
t∗(w, θt, st), st) = τ jt (w, θ
t, st), for j=a,b,iv, (16)
for all (w, θt, st), where yt∗(w, θt, st) ≡ {y∗1(w, θ1, s1), y∗2(w, θ2, s2), ..., y∗t (w, θt, st)}.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In this decentralization, the interest rate coincides with the intertemporal price in the
component planning problem, i.e., R = Rˆ = (βˆδ)−1.
3.1 wealth taxation at the steady state
In what follows I analyze the properties of optimal wealth taxes at a steady state. To
simplify notation, for the rest of the analysis I focus on steady state wedges (which are
written in terms of skill histories rather than in terms of effective labor realizations).
This is without loss of generality thanks to the mapping in (16) derived in Proposition
2. Throughout I also use recursive notation, where cy∗(θ, w, s), co∗(θ, w, s), and y∗(θ, w, s)
should be interpreted as the policy functions used to generate the optimal allocation
{c∗, y∗}.
For each (θ, w, s), steady state inter-vivos wedges are naturally defined by
1− τiv(θ, w, 1) ≡ u
′(co∗(θ, w, 1))
βu′(cy∗(θ, w, 1))
. (17)
On the other hand, I summarize savings and bequest distortions by means of expected
wedges. Specifically, I define expected savings and bequest wedges, respectively, as
1− τ¯a(θ, w, s) ≡ u
′(cy∗(θ, w, s))
Rˆδ
∫
θ′
1
u′(co∗(θ′, w1(θ, w, s), 1))
dF(θ′), (18)
and
1− τ¯b(θ, w, s) ≡ u
′(cy∗(θ, w, s))
Rˆβδ
∫
θ′
1
u′(cy∗(θ′, w0(θ, w, s), 0))
dF(θ′). (19)
In words, τ¯a(θ, w, s) is the expected marginal savings tax paid in the next period by
dynasty w when the young’s skill is θ and the survival state of the old is s. A similar
interpretation holds for τ¯b(θ, w, s). Using expected wedges is a convenient way to
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encapsulate the intertemporal distortions on individuals making wealth accumulation
decisions (i.e., agents with a given state (θ, w, s) who accumulate a′(θ, w, s) in the current
period).
Next I establish the main result of the section:
Proposition 3. Optimal intertemporal wealth wedges satisfy:
τ¯a(θ, w, s) = β
µ(θ, w, s)
f (θ)
u′(cy∗(θ, w, s))
λˆ
P′(θ)
P(θ)
, and (20)
τ¯b(θ, w, s) = −βµ(θ, w, s)
f (θ)
u′(cy∗(θ, w, s))
λˆ
P′(θ)
1− P(θ) − βˆ
(
βˆ
β
− 1
)
u′(cy∗(θ, w, s))
λˆ
, (21)
where µ(θ, w, s) ≥ 0 is the costate associated to the incentive constraint in problem (9).
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The key properties on wealth taxes derived in the simple example of Section 2.1 also
hold in the fully fledged model: life expectancy heterogeneity across skills creates a force
for taxing savings and for subsidizing bequests (see first terms in (20) and (21)). The same
intuition applies here. In a nutshell, the signs of savings and bequest wedges reflect that
the social planner tilts consumption of low types towards the death state to discourage
deviations from high types (who live longer on average).
Additionally, optimal taxes on bequests are shaped by the difference between social
and individual coefficients of altruism. The fact that βˆ > β has two effects on τ¯b. First,
it creates a force for marginally subsidizing both post-mortem transfers to descendants.
Essentially, when βˆ > β society cares more about descendants than parents themselves,
which makes it optimal to encourage intergenerational transfers. Second, any difference
between βˆ and β renders tax schedules on bequests progressive, in the sense that marginal
taxes are increasing in θ.10
In what follows, I will refer to the first and second terms on the formula for τ¯b as the
“differential longevity” and “externality from giving” terms, respectively. The “externality
from giving” effect is discussed in detail by Farhi and Werning (2010). More generally,
such a force also impact optimal taxes on other types of intergenerational transfers, such
as inter-vivos gifts in my framework. This last point is shown formally in Proposition 4:
10This property immediately follows from the concavity of the utility functions and the fact that
consumption allocations are increasing in θ under (10).
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Proposition 4. The optimal wedge on inter-vivos transfers satisfies:
τiv(θ, w, 1) = −
(
βˆ
β
− 1
)
u′(co∗(θ, w, 1))
λˆ
. (22)
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Since inter-vivos transfers are intratemporal in nature, life expectancy heterogeneity has
no effect on τiv.
3.2 allowing the old to bequeath
In this section I drop the assumption whereby the old were precluded from passing on
wealth to younger generations post-mortem. Relaxing this assumption does not alter
the optimal tax formulae in Propositions 3 and 4, but requires defining new wedges,
generalizing the previous tax implementation, and characterizing new taxes.
Notably, in this more general environment, inheritances can come in three forms,
depending on the ages of the giver and the receiver. The first type is what I call early
bequests from parents. These are just the bequests considered in the previous sections, i.e.,
inheritances received when young transferred from parents who died prematurely. The
second type are late bequests, which are inheritances received when old made by parents
who survived to the second period. Finally, one has to contemplate the possibility of early
bequests from grandparents. These latter correspond to wealth transfers from the old to
young individuals who, in the following period, have outlived their parents.
Given the new taxonomy of bequests, I define two additional wedges affecting intergen-
erational transfers. Let ob1t : W ×Θt × {0, 1}t−1 → R and ob2t : W ×Θt × {0, 1}t−1 → R
denote the late bequest wedge and the early bequest wedge from grandparents, respec-
tively. These distortions are defined as:
1− ob1t (w, θt, (st−1, 1)) ≡
u′(co∗t−1(w, θ
t−1, st−1))
Rˆδβu′(co∗t (w, (θt−1, θt), (st−1, 1)))
,
and
1− ob2t (w, θt, (st−1, 0)) ≡
u′(co∗t−1(w, θ
t−1, st−1))
Rˆδβ2u′(cy∗t (w, (θt−1, θt), (st−1, 0)))
.
The late bequest wedge ob1t is an implicit linear tax on bequests received when old
from parents. Analogously, the early bequest wedge from grandparents ob2t is an implicit
linear tax on bequests received when old from grandparents. The corresponding explicit
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tax implementation parallels Proposition 2, and is therefore left out.
Along the lines of Section 3.1, I define the expected wedges on late bequests and on
early bequests from grandparents as:
1− o¯b1(θ, w, 1) ≡ u
′(co∗(θ, w, 1))
Rˆδβ
∫
θ′
1
u′(co∗(θ′, w1(θ, w, 1), 1))
dF(θ′),
and
1− o¯b2(θ, w, 1) ≡ u
′(co∗(θ, w, s))
Rˆβδβ2
∫
θ′
1
u′(cy∗(θ′, w0(θ, w, 1), 0))
dF(θ′).
Proposition 5 characterizes o¯b1 and o¯b2 (the proof is omitted):
Proposition 5. Optimal intertemporal wealth wedges satisfy:
o¯b1(θ, w, 1) =
µ(θ, w, 1)
f (θ)
u′(co∗(θ, w, 1))
λˆ
P′(θ)
P(θ)
−
(
βˆ
β
− 1
)
u′(co∗(θ, w, 1))
λˆ
, and (23)
o¯b2(θ, w, 1) = −µ(θ, w, 1)
f (θ)
u′(co∗(θ, w, 1))
λˆ
P′(θ)
1− P(θ) −
( βˆ
β
)2
− 1
 u′(co∗(θ, w, 1))
λˆ
, (24)
where µ(θ, w, s) ≥ 0 is the costate associated to the incentive constraint in problem (9).
Taken together, Propositions 3 and 5 lead to the following general conclusion: life
expectancy differentials push for marginal taxation (subsidization) of wealth accumulated
by the old (young). In the case of the old, such wealth can come in the form of savings
or late bequests. The young, on the other hand, accumulate wealth in the form of early
bequests from parents or grandparents.
Just like τ¯a and τ¯b in Proposition 3, the expected wedges o¯b1 and o¯b2 can be decomposed
into a “differential longevity” and an “externality from giving” term. Interestingly, these
forces go in different directions in the case of o¯b1 . Hence, the sign of this bequest wedge
is, in principle, undetermined.
3.3 annuities
In the previous sections, it was shown that the social planner can exploit mortality risk to
provide incentives. But what if individuals could privately hedge against such a risk? In
this section I address this question by constructing a tax implementation which allows
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households to trade annuities. I show that the optimal wealth taxes derived previously
are robust to the inclusion of annuities in the decentralization.
The annuity market works as follows. In each period, young individuals purchase
annuities in the amount zt : W × Θt × {0, 1}t → R+ (short selling of annuities is
precluded). In the following period, individuals receive zt units of the consumption good
before taxes contingent on survival. Annuity contracts are non-exclusive and linear, with
q ≥ 0 denoting the per unit price of annuities in terms of the consumption good.11 These
contracts are supplied by a continuum of insurers who are Bertrand competitors and
make zero profits in equilibrium. In addition, the government taxes annuity returns
according to the marginal rate tzt , with t
z
t :W × [0, y¯]t × {0, 1}t → R.
Like in the implementation of Section 3, individuals can also trade a risk free asset and
are subject to the wealth taxes described previously. Hence, dynasties face the sequence
of budget constraints:
cyt + at+1 + qzt+1 ≤ yt − Tyt (w, yt, st)
+ (1− st)Rat(1− ttb(w, yt, st)) + stgt(1− tivt (w, yt, st)), (25)
cot + gt ≤ Rat(1− tat (w, yt, (st−1, 1))) + zt(1− tzt (w, yt, (st−1, 1)))
+ Lt(w, yt, (st−1, 1)), (26)
for all (t, w, θt, st). A competitive equilibrium with annuities is defined along the lines of
Definition 1 (see Appendix A.6).
Proposition 6. Let {c∗, y∗} be an optimal allocation that solves (RPP). Suppose that the policy
functions used to generate {c∗, y∗} satisfy Assumption 3 and that there is no bunching. Then
{c∗, y∗} can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with annuities in which taxes on savings,
bequests, and inter-vivos transfers satisfy (16). Moreover, annuity taxes and savings taxes coincide,
i.e., tat (w, y
t, st) = tzt (w, y
t, st) for all (t, w, yt, st).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Proposition 6 devices an implementation such that optimal wealth taxes derived pre-
viously are unaffected by the presence of the annuity market. Essentially, the government
taxes annuity returns so that individuals cannot fully hedge against mortality risk.
It is worth noting that annuity markets are not shut down under the current de-
centralization: As shown in the proof, individuals at the top of the skill distribution
11Refer to Hosseini (2014) for a detailed justification on the assumptions of non-exclusivity and linear
pricing.
21
do buy annuities in equilibrium. In addition, annuity and capital taxes coincide under
the optimal policy, so there is still no need to introduce differential savings taxation to
implement the optimum.
4 quantitative analysis
This section gauges the quantitative relevance of the forces identified previously. The
model is parameterized in Section 4.1, and calibrated in Section 4.2. Quantitative results
are discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1 parameterization
Preferences. I assume that individuals have log-preferences over consumption and
isoelastic disutility on effort. Specifically,
u(c) = log(c), and h(n) = ζ
n1+
1
ε
1+ 1ε
, (27)
where ε > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and ζ > 0 is a scale factor which
determines the level of effort.
Skill Distribution. The distribution of skills F is lognormal for low skills, but Pareto
distributed for high skills. I denote by θPareto the skill threshold above which the Pareto
tail is appended.
Probability of Survival across Skills. Let ηt(θ) denote the mortality hazard rate of type
θ at age t. I assume that mortality follows a mixed proportional hazard model with
log ηt(θ) = E [log(ν)| log(θ)] · ϕ · t, (28)
where ν ∈ R+ is an index that represents each individual’s “frailty,” and thus summarizes
all sources of mortality risk other that age. Following Einav et al. (2010), ν is log-normal
with
log(ν) ∼ N
(
µν, σ2ν
)
. (29)
The joint distribution of θ and ν is parameterized as follows. Let F and G denote
the distribution functions of log(θ) and log(ν), respectively. I assume that the joint
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distribution of these variables is given by
H
(
log(θ), log(ν)
)
= Cρ
(
F(log(θ)), G(log(ν))
)
, (30)
where Cρ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] is the bivariate Gaussian copula with correlation parameter ρ.12
Given (28)-(30), the probability of survival across skills at age t is
Pt(θ) = P˜t
(
exp
(
µν + ρσνΦ−1 (F(log(θ)))
)
; ϕ
)
, (31)
where P˜t(ν; ϕ) = exp
(
−ν · exp(ϕt)−1ϕ
)
, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal distribution (see Appendix B). As it is clear from (31), Pt(θ) increases
with θ as long as ρ < 0.
4.2 calibration
Each period in the model comprises 15 years. Individuals enter the economy when they
are 50 years old, so that individuals are aged 50-64 in the first period, and 65-79 in the
second period (if alive). The probability of survival P(θ) corresponds to P80(θ)/P64(θ) in
equation (31).
Table 1 shows the values of the parameters in the benchmark calibration. A set of
parameters is chosen based on previous studies. Within this group, I set the annual
intertemporal discount factor δ to 0.95 and the Frisch elasticity ε to 0.5.
I calibrate the skill distribution following Mankiw et al. (2009). These authors proxy
ability using hourly wages in the 2007 Current Population Survey and append a Pareto
distribution with a tail index of 2 for θ ≥ θPareto = 42.5. Given that ability is mapped
to hourly wages, I proxy n with hours worked, and calibrate the scale factor ζ in the
disutility for labor to match the total number of hours worked per year by individuals in
the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX).
The rest of the parameters are either estimated or calibrated to match certain features
of the data. Such procedures are described in what follows.
12The Gaussian copula is defined by Cρ(a, b) ≡ Nρ
(
Φ−1(a),Φ−1(b)
)
, where Nρ is the standard bivariate
normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution.
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Table 1: Benchmark Calibration.
Parameter Symbol Value Source
Period length T 15 years
Annual subjective discount factor δ
1
T 0.95
Frisch elasticity ε 0.50 Chetty et al. (2011)
Scale factor in labor disutility ζ 0.05 See Text
Distribution of log(θ) F(θ) See text Mankiw et al. (2009)
Mean of log(ν) µν -5.05 Estimation
Std. dev. of log(ν) σν 1.15 Estimation
Gompertz shape parameter ϕ 0.12 Estimation
Correlation parameter ρ -0.36 Calibration
Individual altruism coefficient β 1.45 Calibration
Social altruism coefficient βˆ 1.60 See Text
4.2.1 parameters of the probability of survival Pt (θ )
Below I describe the estimation of µν, σν, ϕ, and ρ. I conclude by evaluating the out-of-
sample performance of the model’s calibrated survival probability in (31).
Data. I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is a biennial panel
survey administered by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.
This survey interviews a representative sample of individuals over 50 years old and
their spouses in the US. The HRS provides detailed information on income, assets, and
mortality since 1992, which makes it particularly suitable for calibrating the probability
of survival across earning abilities. I use version O of the RAND HRS release.
My sample is restricted between years 1998-2012 or, equivalently, waves 4-11 in HRS. I
also restrict my sample to males aged between 60-71 years in 1998. The age range and
wave choices are founded on two grounds. First, this sample permits collecting mortality
data on a large and relatively homogeneous cohort over a reasonably long period of time
(around fourteen years). Second, the sample is chosen in order to increase the number
of deaths across consecutive waves, which I use to calibrate ρ below. After filtering
individuals whose dates of entry, exit, or death are missing, my benchmark sample boils
down to 3,260 males in 1998.13 While the benchmark sample pools different races, I also
13The data that I use combines individuals from two different entry cohorts in the survey: the Initial
HRS Cohort (born between 1931-1942) which was first interviewed in 1992, and the Children of the Depression
Cohort (born between 1924-1947) which was first interviewed in 1998. Around 70% of the observations in
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limit the observations to white males for robustness below.
Frailty Distribution Parameters (µν, σν, ϕ). I estimate µν, σν, and ϕ by maximum likeli-
hood by utilizing data on realized mortality outcomes of the individuals in the sample.
While this method is fairly standard within the survival analysis literature, my approach
is particularly close to the one in Einav et al. (2010), who estimate analogous parameters
for the U.K. based on confidential annuity data.
I recover mortality outcomes by following individuals from the time they enter the
sample (year 1998) throughout the last wave (2012) until they either die or exit due to
right-censoring. In HRS the respondents’ ages of entry, exit, and death are reported in
days, so I treat mortality as a continuous process. Let ai be the age when individual i
entered the sample, a¯i be the age when the individual exited, and let di ∈ {0, 1} indicate
whether individual i exited because of death (di = 1) or censoring (di = 0).14 Given
this information and denoting the actual date of death by x, the likelihood of observing
mi ≡ (ai, a¯i, di) is
Pr(mi|ν, ϕ) = Pr (x = a¯i|t > ai, ν, ϕ)di Pr (x ≥ a¯i|t > ai, ν, ϕ)1−di , (32)
or
Pr(mi|ν, ϕ) =
(
−∂P˜a¯i(ν; ϕ)/∂t
P˜ai(ν; ϕ)
)di ( P˜a¯i(ν; ϕ)
P˜ai(ν; ϕ)
)1−di
, (33)
where ∂P˜t(ν; ϕ)/∂t = −ν exp
(
ϕt + νϕ (1− exp(ϕt))
)
is the Gompertz density.
The log-likelihood is
`
(
ϕ, µν, σν|(mi)Ni=1
)
=
N
∑
i=1
log
(∫
Pr(mi|ν, ϕ)g(ν|µν, σν)dν
)
. (34)
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation. The first row corresponds to the
benchmark sample described previously. The second row, as a robustness check, reports
the estimates when further restricting the sample to white males. Clearly, estimates do
not vary significantly across the two samples. This is mainly because the benchmark
specification is overwhelmingly dominated by the white population.15
my sample come from the former.
14Based on my sample restrictions, individuals’ ages are normalized by subtracting 60.
15When restricting the sample to whites only, µν decreases while σν increases. Essentially, there are two
effects at play which operate in different directions. On the one hand, lifespans among blacks are shorter
and more variable than among whites (see Firebaugh et al. (2014)). On the other hand, hispanics present
longer and less variable lifespans than whites (see Lariscy et al. (2015)). In my example, the impact on the
mean (variance) seems to be dominated by the first (second) effect.
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Table 2: Frailty Distribution Estimates.
Estimates
Sample µν σν ϕ No. of Obs. Fraction of Deaths (%)
Males (benchmark) -5.046 1.149 0.119 3,260 42.8
(0.330) (0.236) (0.019)
White males -5.260 1.215 0.128 2,716 41.5
(0.402) (0.274) (0.022)
Notes: Both samples correspond to males aged between 60-71 in wave 4 of RAND HRS data (ver-
sion O). “Fraction of Deaths” denotes the percentage of individuals who died between waves 4
and 11. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Correlation parameter (ρ). I calibrate ρ, the parameter controlling the correlation be-
tween log(θ) and log(ν), by simulating lifespans and matching two-year mortality rates
across permanent income quartiles in the data. Details follow.
I target mortality rates between waves 5 (year 2000) and 6 (year 2002). My focus on
mortality rates across consecutive waves is justified by the fact that ρ drives the correlation
between skills and the instantaneous probability of dying. This suggests that ρ is best
identified from mortality data at the highest possible frequency, which is two years in the
HRS survey. I choose waves 5 and 6 in order to have a sufficiently large number of deaths
across waves.16
In order to stratify the population into permanent income categories, I further restrict
my sample to retirees.17 In particular, for each respondent, permanent income is measured
as the average of current non-asset retirement income over waves 5 and 6, as long as the
individual is alive. Current non-asset income is the sum of income from Social Security
retirement benefits, employer pensions, annuities, veteran’s benefits, welfare, and food
stamps. This measure of permanent income is along the lines of De Nardi et al. (2010),
and it is motivated by the positive correlation between labor income before retirement,
and Social Security and pension benefits. I define permanent income quartiles separately
for singles and couples using sample weights provided by HRS. The resulting sample
after eliminating non-retirees consists of 1,534 respondents.18
16Given the sample restrictions described above, the largest number of deaths across waves occurs
between waves 5-6 and 9-10. While the latter period dominates in terms of the death count, identifying ρ is
more challenging there since mortality differentials diminish with age (see, e.g., Hurd et al. (2001)). For this
reason, I work with waves 5-6, instead, which includes younger individuals.
17The focus on retirees also eliminates the effect of health on income.
18Individuals with zero or missing values for permanent income are also dropped.
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To simulate the model, I assume that observed permanent (pre-tax) income is mono-
tonic in skills.19 Due to this assumption, the model’s mortality rates across permanent
income quartiles can be generated by simulating lifespans across the underlying skill
distribution instead.
Table 3 reports the results. The first two columns show the two-year weighted
mortality rates profiles in the benchmark sample, along with its simulated counterparts.
The last two columns present those moments when the sample only includes white males.
As expected, the correlation between skills and frailty is negative, so that individuals
with higher talent tend to live longer. The calibrated value of ρ is -0.365 when using
the benchmark sample. This figure does not change significantly under the alternative
specification which only incorporates whites. (Appendix B provides additional details on
the calibration of ρ.)
Table 3: Two-year Mortality Rates: Model Vs. Data.
Males (benchmark) White Males
Income Quartile Data (%) Model (%) Data (%) Model (%)
Lowest 10.2 10.0 9.7 9.1
2 7.9 6.9 8.3 6.6
3 5.9 5.5 5.7 5.0
Highest 4.2 3.8 4.4 3.7
No. of Obs. 1,534 1,318
Fraction of Deaths (%) 7.0 6.9
Calibrated ρ -0.36 -0.33
Notes: “Income Quartile” indicates the different quartiles of the Permanent Income distribu-
tion which construction is described in the text. The samples correspond to males aged be-
tween 60-71 in wave 4 of RAND HRS data (version O) who retired by wave 5. “Data” shows
weighted mortality rates between waves 5 and 6. “Model” corresponds to the moments gen-
erated by the numerical simulations. The artificial data is generated as follows. I draw 2, 000
individuals, where each individual corresponds to a wage-age pair. For each individual, I
then draw a pair (θ, ν) over a grid of values for ρ. I sort individuals by skill levels, and then
simulate their life spans within skill quartiles. I repeat this procedure 200 times and com-
pute two-year mortality rates by taking averages across simulations. The calibrated value of
ρ minimizes the distance between the simulated moments and its data counterparts.
19This assumption holds in large scale economies when the tax system is calibrated to the actual US tax
code. See, for example, Conesa et al. (2009).
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Out-of-Sample Fit. To conclude this section, I evaluate the out-of-sample performance
of the survival probability Pt(θ) just estimated. These results are presented in Figure 1.
There I focus on individuals over 60 years old, which corresponds to the age group in my
sample.
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Figure 1: Average Life Expectancy across Ages. Panel (a) plots average
life expectancy in the model and in cohort life tables for U.S. males
born in years 1930 and 1940 (Bell and Miller (2005)). Panel (b) reports
the difference in average life expectancy between males at the top
and bottom 50% of the permanent income distribution. The solid
line corresponds to the difference predicted by the model. The other
markers are taken from Waldron (2007), who estimates such difference
for male Social Security-Covered workers using the Social Security
Administration’s Continuous Work History Sample.
Panel (a) provides an external point of reference for judging levels of life expectancy
implied by Pt(θ). The figure compares average life expectancy in the model against U.S.
cohort life tables. The latter are taken from Bell and Miller (2005), who estimate such
life tables on a decennial basis between birth years 1900-2100. I use the tables for males
born in 1930 and 1940 since these years roughly apply to the oldest and the youngest
respondents in my sample.20 Notably, the model fits the data fairly well along this
dimension. In particular, and as one would expect, the predicted life expectancy for
young (old) individuals gets closer to the data of 1940 (1930) cohort tables.
Panel (b) plots the differences in average life expectancies between individuals above
and below the median of the permanent income distribution. Here I compare the
20Most individuals in my sample where born between 1927-1938.
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values predicted by the model against the estimates of Waldron (2007), who computes
such a difference in life expectancy for selected cohorts of male Social Security-Covered
workers.21 Although she uses a confidential data set which is much larger than the one
used in this paper, the values implied by this model are in the same ballpark as those
estimated in her work.
4.2.2 altruism coefficients
Individual Altruism β. I calibrate the coefficient of individual altruism β by matching
the ratio between consumption of the young and consumption of the old in the data.
Specifically, I consider a (sub-optimal) competitive equilibrium in which agents’ pref-
erences are represented by (1). I assume that inter-vivos transfers go untaxed, which
is not an implausible assumption for the US.22 In such an environment, the following
intergenerational Euler equation holds under fairly general conditions:
u′(cot (w, θt, st)) = βu′(c
y
t (w, θ
t, st)),
for all t and for all (w, θt, st), which under the log-utlity specification in (27) yields
β =
Cy
Co
, (35)
with Cj ≡ E
[
cjt(w, θ
t, st)
]
for j = y, o, where the expectation is taken over (t, w, θt, st).
Hence, Cy/Co can be used to pin down the intergenerational discount factor. I recover
such ratio using nondurable consumption data from the CEX survey. To be consistent with
the frequency in my calibration, young households are identified as those with working
heads between 50 and 64 years old receiving positive labor income. The old include
all households with retired heads between 65 and 79 years old. Averaging aggregate
consumption measures between 1980-2003 gives β = 1.45.23 Roughly in line with this
number, Boldrin et al. (2015) argue that β should be bigger than one to match a ratio
between consumption while working and consumption while retired between 1.25-1.43.24
21To be sure, Waldron (2007) focuses on mortality differentials across socioeconomic status. However,
this is proxied by average relative earnings of individuals between 45-55, which can also be used a measure
of permanent income. She uses data from the Social Security Administration’s Continuous Work History
Sample.
22Under the current US tax code, gifts under a certain amount are tax-free (for 2015, the annual exclusion
is $14,000 per recipient per year). Poterba (2001) and McGarry (2013) document that such annual exclusion
is not binding for the majority of US households.
23This value is fairly robust to including durable consumption or to modifying the time period.
24Jones and Schoonbroodt (2016) also find that the intergenerational discount factor should be bigger
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Additional details on the data are contained in Appendix B.
Social Altruism βˆ. While the social level of altruism is a normative parameter, I use the
interest rate prevailing in the decentralization to discipline the choice of βˆ. In particular,
my implementation requires βˆ = (Rδ)−1, so that given the value of δ in Table 1, βˆ is
pinned down by R. I target a steady state interest rate of 2% at an annual frequency. This
yields βˆ = 1.604.
4.3 quantitative results
Constrained optimal allocations are computed numerically as follows. First, I solve the
component planning problem (9) by value function iteration over a grid of (w, s) for a
given shadow price λˆ. The optimal control problem embedded in each step of the value
function iteration algorithm is solved using GPOPS-ii software. The value function is
interpolated using Chebyshev polynomials. Given the solution of the component planning
problem, I approximate a steady state distribution of continuation utility entitlements
via Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, I iterate on the shadow price λˆ until the resource
constraint (RC) holds at the steady state.
Next I quantify the taxes on wealth which are being affected by life expectancy
differentials, namely, savings and bequest taxes (see Section 3). I consider the more
general interpretation in Section 3.2, thus allowing the old to make post-mortem transfers.
As a consequence, bequests below are broken down into three types: early bequests from
parents, early bequests from grandparents, and late bequests.
Table 4: Expected wealth taxes at the steady state on dynasties with median w.
Annualized Rate (%) Contribution of P′
Savings 0.23 0.23
Late Bequests -1.32 0.31
Early Bequests from Parents -1.14 -0.34
Early Bequests from Grandparents -2.42 -0.46
Table 4 reports expected distortions on a dynasty whose utility entitlement w sits at
the median of the cross-sectional distribution Ψ at the steady state.25 Such a dynasty
than one to match the empirical capital-output ratio.
25As shown in Section 3.1, steady state distortions are written as a function of three terms: w, θ, and s.
In Table 4, I set w to its median, and take averages across θ and s.
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is meant to be representative of the population of dynasties in the economy. The first
column combines the effects of the “differential longevity” and “externality from giving”
terms entering the tax formulae. The last column isolates the impact of the first term,
which is the main focus of the analysis.
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Figure 2: Expected wealth taxes at the steady state on dynasties with
median w across incomes and survival states.
On average, the magnitude of the effect of differential longevity on optimal wealth
taxes is quantitatively relevant: as per Table 4, such a force ranges between 23-46 basis
points at annual rates. Those values are commensurate with the magnitudes of taxes on
net worth in certain developed countries. For example, Switzerland imposes progressive
wealth taxes ranging between 3-94 basis point per annum (depending on the cantons);
or the “solidarity tax on wealth” in France varies between 0.5-1.5%. In the US, local
governments levy annual property taxes with rates in the order of 1%.
Figure 2 displays expected distortions across income and survival states for dynasties
with the median w. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the corresponding contribution of the
differential longevity term. A number of key lessons should be drawn from these figures.
First, life expectancy heterogeneity pushes for regressive taxation in the income range
shown.
Second, while the taxation of bequests is progressive overall (due to giving externali-
ties), bequest taxes are not progressive across the board (see Figure 2(b)). This reflects that
the regressive force coming from differential longevity may have a significant influence
on the shape of tax rates.
Third, according to Figure 3, there is substantial variation in the influence of longevity
heterogeneity across income levels. As for savings taxes, annual expected distortions
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climb up to 0.4% for low incomes, and asymptote at roughly half of that value at the top.
The variation in bequest distortions is even larger, and ranges from 0.2%-0.8% in absolute
terms.
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Figure 3: Contribution of longevity heterogeneity to expected wealth
taxes at the steady state on dynasties with median w across incomes
and survival states.
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Figure 4: Relative contribution of longevity heterogeneity to expected
wealth taxes at the steady state on dynasties with median w across
incomes and survival states. The relative contribution of longevity
heterogeneity is defined as the ratio between the “differential longevity”
and the “externality from giving” terms in the expected tax formulae.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the relative contribution of the “differential longevity” with
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respect to the “externality from giving” term. When it comes to early bequests, the former
can dominate the latter for incomes above USD 60,000 or USD 100,000, depending on the
survival state. Those thresholds correspond, roughly, to the the 90th and 95th percentiles
of the income distribution.26
5 conclusion
Economists in the 80s initiated a profound debate around the motives behind wealth
accumulation and on the relative magnitudes of the three sources of wealth, i.e., earned,
inherited, and coming from inter-vivos transfers.27 On this “savings puzzle” Laurence
Kotlikoff said: “The answer to the savings puzzle has many policy implications; certain
tax structures are much more conducive to some types of savings than others...” (Kotlikoff
(1988), page 41).
This paper studies the optimal design of such “tax structures.” It distinguishes
between the optimal tax treatment of the different sources of wealth, and points to the
socioeconomic mortality gradient as a crucial determinant both from a theoretical and
from a quantitative angle.
The analysis admits a number of extensions. First, mortality risk was assumed to be
exogenous, while in reality human and health capital shape life expectancy and interact
with the tax code. Another natural step is to adapt the current framework to optimal
social security design. Finally, this study recommends tying the tax system to parental
survival as an optimal policy, so quantitatively evaluating partial reforms based on this
feature looks like a promising route.
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Appendix
A proofs
A.1 proof of proposition 1
I only derive the expressions for τa(θL) and τb(θL). Showing that τa(θH) = τb(θH) = 0 is
analogous. First order conditions for the relaxed planning problem in (4) include:
u′(cy1(θ))(1− µ) = λ, (A.1)
δRˆu′(co2(θ))
(
1− µP(θH)
P(θL)
)
= λ, (A.2)
δRˆβu′(c˜y2(θL))
(
1− µ1− P(θH)
1− P(θL)
)
= λ. (A.3)
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Combining (A.1) and (A.2) and applying the definition of savings wedge yields the
expression for τa(θL). The formula for τb(θL) is obtained similarly by combining (A.1)
and (A.3).
A.2 proof of lemma 1
Define
M(θ′; θ) ≡ su(co(θ′)) + β
(
u(cy(θ′))− h
(
y(θ′)
θ
))
+ βδP(θ)w1(θ′) + βδ(1 − P(θ))w0(θ′).
Incentive compatibility requires that for all θ ∈ Θ M(θ′; θ) attain a global maximum at
θ′ = θ. First note that at a local maximum one must have M1(θ; θ) = 0 and M11(θ; θ) ≤ 0.
Using the definition of M, the first order condition can be written as
su′(co(θ))
dco(θ)
dθ′
+ β
(
u′(cy(θ))
dcy(θ)
dθ′
− h′
(
y(θ)
θ
)
1
θ
dy(θ)
dθ′
)
+ βδ
(
P(θ)
dw1(θ)
dθ′
+ (1− P(θ))dw
0(θ)
dθ′
)
= 0. (A.4)
Differentiating the first order condition M1(θ; θ) = 0 with respect to θ gives M11(θ; θ) =
−M12(θ; θ). Hence, the second order condition for local maxima at the θ′ = θ is equivalent
to M12(θ; θ) ≥ 0, or
β
1
θ2
[
h′
(
y(θ)
θ
)
+ h′′
(
y(θ)
θ
)
y(θ)
θ
]
dy(θ)
dθ′
+ βδP′(θ)
d
(
w1(θ)− w0(θ))
dθ′
≥ 0. (A.5)
Clearly, (10) implies (A.5). Therefore, (10) and the local incentive constraints of (9)
guarantee that θ′ = θ is a local maximum of M(θ′; θ). I now show that the same holds for
global maxima.
Evaluating (A.4) at θ′ gives
su′(co(θ′))
dco(θ′)
dθ′
+ βu′(cy(θ′))
dcy(θ′)
dθ′
=
βh′
(
y(θ′)
θ′
)
1
θ′
dy(θ′)
dθ′
− βδP(θ′)dw
1(θ′)
dθ′
− βδ(1− P(θ′))dw
0(θ′)
dθ′
.
Using this expression and the definition of M(θ′; θ) it follows that
M1(θ′; θ) = β
[
h′
(
y(θ′)
θ′
)
1
θ′
− h′
(
y(θ′)
θ
)
1
θ
]
dy(θ′)
dθ′
+ βδ(P(θ)− P(θ′))d
(
w1(θ′)− w0(θ′))
dθ′
. (A.6)
38
Now take any θ′ < θ. By (10), equation (A.6) implies M1(θ′; θ) ≥ 0. Analogously, for any
θ′ such that θ′ > θ it follows that M1(θ′; θ) ≤ 0. Hence, since M1(θ; θ) = 0, I obtain
sign
(
M1(θ′; θ)
)
= sign
(
θ − θ′) ,
which implies that a global maximum is attained at θ′ = θ.
A.3 proof of proposition 2
I start by establishing a preliminary result. Consider the recursive formulation to the
relaxed planning problem. Let D∗ ≡ {(y, w, s) : ∃θ such that y = y∗(θ, w, s)}, where
y∗(θ, w, s) is the policy function for effective labor associated to skill θ and state vector
(w, s). Assumption 3 and the absence of bunching imply that there exists functions
cˆj : D∗ → R and wˆj : D∗ → R such that for all θ:
cˆj(y∗(θ, w, s), w, s) = cj∗(θ, w, s), j = y, o, (A.7)
and
wˆs(y∗(θ, w, s), w, s) = ws∗(θ, w, s), s = 0, 1. (A.8)
Moving on to the sequential formulation, define
Dt∗ ≡
{
(w, yt, st) : ∃θt such that yt = {y∗1(w, θ1, s1), y∗2(w, θ2, s2), ..., y∗t (w, θt, st)}
}
,
i.e., the set Dt∗ defines the triple (w, yt, st) such that, given (w, st), there exists a skill
history θt for which yt corresponds to a history of optimal effective labor allocations.
Using (A.7)-(A.8), it is now is possible to generate a sequence of functions {cˆyt , cˆot}∞t=1 with
cˆjt : Dt∗ → R for j = y, o, such that for all (w, θt, st):
cˆjt(w, y
t∗(w, θt, st), st) = cj∗t (w, θ
t, st), (A.9)
where yt∗(w, θt, st) ≡ {y∗1(w, θ1, s1), y∗2(w, θ2, s2), ..., y∗t (w, θt, st)}.
The existence of the functions in (A.9) allow me to write optimal taxes in terms of
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observable effective effort rather than skills. Specifically, define wealth taxes by
1− tivt (w, yt, (st, 1)) ≡

u′(cˆot (w,yt,(st,1)))
βu′(cˆyt (w,yt,(st,1)))
, if (w, yt, st) ∈ Dt∗,
0, otherwise,
(A.10)
1− tat (w, yt, (st−1, 1)) ≡

u′(cˆyt−1(w,y
t−1,st−1))
Rˆδu′(cˆot (w,(yt−1,yt),(st−1,1)))
, if (w, yt, st) ∈ Dt∗,
0, otherwise,
(A.11)
1− tbt (w, yt, (st−1, 0)) ≡

u′(cˆyt−1(w,y
t−1,st−1)
Rˆδβu′(cˆyt (w,(yt−1,yt),(st−1,0)))
, if (w, yt, st) ∈ Dt∗,
0, otherwise,
(A.12)
where Rˆ is the steady state intertemporal price in (8) used to solve the component
planning problem.
Next I define income taxes and lump-sum transfers in the optimal system. It is worth
noting, though, that these quantities can only be pinned down for a given asset-gift
allocation {a, g}. Put differently, the levels of savings, gifts, income taxes and transfers
are undetermined in the decentralization (this follows by applying a standard Ricardian
equivalence argument). In my notion of implementation, savings and inter-vivos transfers
are constant across types, but many other choices would work. In particular, I consider the
case in which all agents are induced to hold zero risk-free assets, and to make inter-vivos
gifts in the amount g > 0. Given these choices, I define the income taxes Tyt and transfers
Lt as
Tyt (w, y
t, st) ≡
yt + stg(1− tivt (w, yt, st))− cˆ
y
t (w, y
t, st), if (w, yt, st) ∈ Dt∗,
+∞, otherwise,
(A.13)
and
Lt(w, yt, (st−1, 1)) ≡
cˆot (w, yt, (st−1, 1)) + g, if (w, yt, (st−1, 1)) ∈ Dt∗,−∞, otherwise. (A.14)
Now consider the subproblem of a dynasty consisting on choosing consumption
and asset-gift allocations given a sequence of effective labor {yt}∞t=1, with yt(w, θt, st) ≡
{y1(w, θ1, s1), y2(w, θ2, s2), ..., yt(w, θt, st)} for all (t, w, θt, st). The solution to this problem
40
is characterized by the Euler equations
u′(cot (w, θt, st)) = βu′(c
y
t (w, θ
t, st))
(
1− tivt
(
w, yt(w, θt, st), st
))
, (A.15)
and
u′(cyt (w, θ
t, st)) =
Rδβ(1− P(θt))
∫
u′
(
cyt+1(w, (θ
t, θ′), (st, 0)
) (
1− tbt+1
(
w, yt+1(w, (θt, θ′), (st, 0)), (st, 0)
) )
f (θ′)dθ′
+ RδP(θt)
∫
u′
(
cot+1(w, (θ
t, θ′), (st, 1)
) (
1− tat+1
(
w, yt+1(w, (θt, θ′), (st, 1)), (st, 1)
) )
f (θ′)dθ′,
(A.16)
together with the budget constraints (14)-(15), for all (t, w, θt, st).
Let the interest rate be given by R = Rˆ. In that case, the asset-gift allocation specified
previously and the tax system defined in (A.10)-(A.14) imply that the Euler equations and
budget constraints above are satisfied at {cˆyt , cˆot}∞t=1 for all (w, yt, st) ∈ Dt∗. Now consider
the subproblem of choosing {yt}∞t=1 given the optimal consumption and asset-gift choices
just described. To complete the proof, I need to show that for all (t, w, θt, st), each (w, θt, st)
type chooses
yt∗(w, θt, st) ≡ {y∗1(w, θ1, s1), y∗2(w, θ2, s2), ..., y∗t (w, θt, st)}.
This is straightforward to verify. First, agents would never choose (w, yt, st) /∈ Dt∗ due to
large penalties. Second, given their types, agents always choose the optimal allocation of
effective labor intended for them by the planner since {c∗, y∗} is incentive compatible.
The goods market clears because the optimal allocation is resource feasible, while
the asset market clears by construction. Walras’ law then implies that the government’s
budget constraint is satisfied. This completes the proof.
A.4 proof of proposition 3
Let ξ, γ(θ), and µ(θ) denote, respectively, the Lagrange multiplier on the promise-keeping
constraint, the multiplier on the equation defining V(θ), and the costate associated with
the envelope for V ′(θ). Then the Lagrangian to the relaxed planning problem in (9) can
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be written as
L =
∫ {
su(co(θ)) + βˆ
(
u(cy(θ))− h
(
y(θ)
θ
))
− λˆ[sco(θ) + cy(θ)− y(θ)]
+ βˆδP(θ)J(w1(θ), 1) + βˆδ(1− P(θ))J(w0(θ), 0)
}
dF(θ)
+ ξ
[
w−
∫ {
su(co(θ)) + β
(
u(cy(θ))− h
(
y(θ)
θ
))
+ βδP(θ)w1(θ) + βδ(1− P(θ))w0(θ)
}
dF(θ)
]
+
∫
γ(θ)
[
su(co(θ)) + β
(
u(cy(θ))− h
(
y(θ)
θ
))
+ βδP(θ)w1(θ) + βδ(1− P(θ))w0(θ)− V(θ)
]
dθ
−
∫ {
µ′(θ)V(θ) + µ(θ)β
[
h′
(
y(θ)
θ
)
y(θ)
θ2
+ δP′(θ)
(
w1(θ)− w0(θ)
) ]}
dθ,
where I used that
∫
µ(θ)V ′(θ)dθ = − ∫ µ′(θ)V(θ)dθ.
First order conditions include:
(
su′(co(θ))− λˆs) f (θ)− ξsu′(co(θ)) f (θ) + γ(θ)su′(co(θ)) = 0, (A.17)
(
βˆu′(cy(θ))− λˆ) f (θ)− ξβu′(cy(θ)) f (θ) + γ(θ)βu′(cy(θ)) = 0, (A.18)
βˆP(θ)J1(w1(θ), 1) f (θ)− ξβP(θ) f (θ) + γ(θ)βP(θ)− µ(θ)βP′(θ) = 0, (A.19)
βˆ(1− P(θ))J1(w0(θ), 0) f (θ)− ξβ(1− P(θ)) f (θ) + γ(θ)β(1− P(θ)) + µ(θ)βP′(θ) = 0,
(A.20)
and
− γ(θ)− µ′(θ) = 0. (A.21)
To obtain the expression for the expected bequest wedge, first note that (A.20) can be
written as
J1(w0(θ), 0) f (θ) = ξ
β
βˆ
f (θ)− γ(θ)β
βˆ
− µ(θ)β
βˆ
P′(θ)
1− P(θ) . (A.22)
Also, by (A.18) (
1− λˆ
βˆu′(cy(θ))
)
f (θ) = ξ
β
βˆ
f (θ)− γ(θ)β
βˆ
,
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so combining with (A.22) gives
J1(w0(θ), 0) =
(
1− λˆ
βˆu′(cy(θ))
)
− µ(θ)
f (θ)
β
βˆ
P′(θ)
1− P(θ) . (A.23)
Now note that (A.18) can be rearranged as
ξ =
βˆ
β
− λˆ
β
∫ 1
u′(cy(θ))
dF(θ), (A.24)
where I used that
∫
γ(θ)dθ = 0, which follows from (A.21) and µ(θ) = µ(θ¯) = 0.
Using the envelope condition J1(w, s) = ξ into the left hand side of (A.24) gives
J1(w0(θ), 0) =
βˆ
β
− λˆ
β
∫
θ′
1
u′(cy(θ′, w0(θ), 0))
dF(θ′). (A.25)
The expression for the expected bequest wedge follows by equating (A.23) and (A.25),
and by applying the definition of τ¯b.
The derivation of the optimal expected capital tax is very similar. The expressions in
(A.19) and (A.18) can be rearranged as
βˆ
β
J1(w1(θ), 1) f (θ) =
βˆ
β
(
1− λˆ
βˆu′(cy(θ))
)
f (θ) + µ(θ)
P′(θ)
P(θ)
. (A.26)
Equation (A.17),
∫
γ(θ)dθ = 0, and the envelope condition produce
J1(w1(θ), 1) = 1− λˆ
∫
θ′
1
u′(co(w1(θ), 1, θ′))
dF(θ′). (A.27)
Combining (A.26) and (A.27) and applying the definition of τ¯a gives (20).
A.5 proof of proposition 4
Equations (A.17) and (A.18) give
u′(co(θ))
βu′(cy(θ))
=
βˆ f (θ)− ξ f (θ) + γ(θ)
f (θ)− ξ f (θ) + γ(θ) .
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Using the definition of τiv into the previous expression yields
τiv(θ) = −
(
βˆ
β
− 1
)
f (θ)
f (θ)− ξ f (θ) + γ(θ) .
Applying (A.17) into the right hand side gives (22).
A.6 proof of proposition 6
I begin by formally defining a competitive equilibrium with annuities:
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium with annuities is an allocation for consumption and
effective effort {c, y}, an asset-gift allocation {a, g}, a tax system T ≡ {tat , tbt , tivt , tzt , Ty, Lt}∞t=1,
an interest rate R, and an annuity price q such that:
1. {c, y, a, g} maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraints (25) and (26).
2. Annuity insurers make zero profits.
3. The government’s budget constraint is balanced in every period.
4. The goods market clears.
5. The annuity market clears.
The proof follows by construction and builds on the implementation of Proposition
2. Taxes on inter-vivos transfers, savings, and bequests are defined as in (A.10)-(A.12).
Annuity taxes are given by tzt (w, y
t, st) = tat (w, y
t, st), where tat is defined in (A.11).
I construct a decentralization in which all agents are induced to hold zero risk-free
assets and to make inter-vivos gifts g > 0. As for annuity holdings, I consider a candidate
demand schedule under which only top skill individuals demand annuities, i.e.,
zt(w, θt, st) ≡
z¯, if θt = θ¯,0, otherwise, (A.28)
with z¯ > 0.
Income taxes Tyt and transfers Lt are chosen so that households’ budget constraints
hold with equality at {c∗, y∗}, given the above choices of wealth taxes, asset-gift allocations,
and annuity purchases.
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Finally, let the candidate equilibrium price on annuities be given by:
q =
P(θ¯)
Rˆ
. (A.29)
I claim that this construction constitutes a competitive equilibrium with annuities. First,
paralleling the proof of Proposition 2, functions {cˆyt , cˆot}∞t=1 satisfy the budget constraints
(25)-(26), and the Euler equations (A.15)-(A.16) for all (w, yt, st) ∈ Dt∗. Second, for all
(w, yt, st) ∈ Dt∗, those consumption functions also satisfy the Euler equation for annuity
demand, which is
qu′(cyt (w, θ
t, st)) ≥
P(θt)δ
∫
u′(cot+1(w, (θ
t, θ′), (st, 1))
(
1− tzt+1
(
w, yt+1(w, (θt, θ′), (st, 1)), (st, 1)
) )
f (θ′)dθ′, (A.30)
with equality if zt+1 > 0. Third, under (A.28) and (A.29), annuity insurers make zero
profits. Lastly, incentive compatibility lead each type to choose her corresponding in the
planning problem. All markets clear by construction. This completes the proof.
B additional details on the calibration
B.1 derivation of Pt (θ )
This section describes the derivation of the probability of survival Pt(θ). Let P˜t(ν; ϕ) be
defined by:
−d log P˜t(ν; ϕ)
dt
= ηt(ν).
Then
P˜t(ν; ϕ) = exp
− t∫
0
ηs(ν)ds

= exp
(
−ν · exp(ϕt)− 1
ϕ
)
,
where the last line follows by applying (28) and the initial condition P˜0(ν; ϕ) = 1.
45
Using (30), it follows that (see, e.g., Crane and Van Der Hoek (2008)):
E [log(ν)| log(θ)] =
∞∫
−∞
log(ν)
∂
∂ log(ν)
Φ
(
Φ−1 (G(log(ν)))− ρΦ−1 (F(log(θ)))√
1− ρ2
)
d log(ν)
(B.1)
By (29), G(log(ν)) = Φ
(
log(ν)−µν
σν
)
so (B.1) can be written as
E [log(ν)| log(θ)] = 1
σν
√
1− ρ2
∞∫
−∞
log(ν)φ
 log(ν)−µνσν − ρΦ−1 (F(log(θ)))√
1− ρ2
 d log(ν),
where φ is the standard normal probability density function.
Using the change of variables z ≡ [(log(ν)− µν) /σν − ρΦ−1 (F(log(θ)))] · (1− ρ2)− 12 , it
follows that
E [log(ν)| log(θ)] =
∞∫
−∞
{
µν + σv
[
z
√
1− ρ2 + ρΦ−1 (F(log(θ)))
]}
φ(z)dz
= µν + ρσνΦ−1 (F(log(θ))) . (B.2)
Plugging in (B.2) into P˜t
(
exp (E [log(ν)| log(θ)]) ; ϕ
)
gives (31).
B.2 calibration of β
I use the consumption data in Krueger and Perri (2006), which is processed from the
Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX). CEX provides comprehensive measures of
consumption for a representative cross section of households in the US on a quarterly
basis. Each household in CEX is interviewed for a maximum of four times, and I measure
yearly consumption as the sum of the quarterly measures of consumption reported in
each of these interviews.
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Figure 5: Consumption Data. “Consumption” corresponds to the
nondurable consumption measure elaborated by Krueger and Perri
(2006) using CEX data. Figures expressed in adult equivalent units in
1982-1984 constant dollars using CPI.
I consider two measures of total consumption: one for nondurable consumption (the
benchmark measure), and one which also includes durables. Both of these measures are
elaborated by Krueger and Perri (2006). The first one proxies nondurable consumption by
including food, alcoholic beverages, fuels, education, and health services, among other
categories.28 The second measure incorporates nondurables, as well as imputed values
28See categories 1 through 13 in Table A.1 in that paper.
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for large durables (such as housing and vehicles).29
I exclude rural households, households who haven’t completed four consecutive
interviews, observations corresponding to young households with negative after-tax labor
income, those who report positive labor income but zero hours worked, those reporting
only food consumption, and households reporting zero food consumption. Given this
sample selection, the total number of observations is 13,602 household-years. All data is
weighted using CEX population weights.
Figure 5 shows average nondurable consumption measures across the different co-
horts, along with the corresponding young-to-old consumption ratio. The values for
consumption are expressed in adult equivalent units in 1982-1984 constant dollars using
the Consumption Price Index. When using nondurable consumption, the calibrated value
for beta using is 1.450. The counterpart when including durable consumption is 1.498.
29The authors refer to this measure as “ND+” consumption.
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